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Abstract: The increased use of early agreements in the EU co-decision procedure raises the 
concern that intra and inter-institutional political debate is sacrificed for the sake of efficiency. We 
investigate the effect of early agreements (trilogues) on the time it takes for legislation to be 
negotiated during the first reading of co-decision. We find that the first reading negotiations of 
trilogues on salient legislation take longer than first readings of similar files reconciled at second 
and third reading. First readings of early agreements also appear to last longer when considering 
all co-decision files submitted to the 5
th and 6
th European Parliaments, but the effect is masked by 
a general increase in first reading duration after 2004. We conclude that even if early agreements 
restrict access of certain actors to decision making, they allow for more time for substantive 
debate at the first reading stage than similar files reconciled later in the legislative process. 
Keywords:  co-decision procedure;  Council of Ministers; early agreements; European 
Commission; European Parliament; institutionalization; legislative procedure; joint decision 
making 
                                                 
 
1 Both authors contributed equally to this paper and to Rasmussen and Toshkov (2011). EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-011a.htm    2 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................3 
1.  Early agreements and the co-decision procedure .....................................................4 
2.  What determines first reading duration of co-decision files? ...................................6 
2.1.    Early agreements and conclusion stage ...................................................................  7 
2.2.    Preference heterogeneity ........................................................................................  7 
2.3.    Institutional constraints...........................................................................................  8 
3.  Research design and data ........................................................................................9 
4.  The effect of early agreements on first reading duration ........................................  12 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................  17 
References ............................................................................................................................  18 
List of Tables  
Table 1:  Percentage of co-decision proposals submitted to the 5th and 6th European 
Parliments by finalization stage and year of proposal ..............................................5 
Table 2:  Duration of first reading in months by final stage and year of proposal .................  13 
Table 3:  Negative binomial models of the duration of first readings in months 
for all co-decision files submitted between July 1999 and July 2009 .....................  14 
Table 4:  Negative binomial models of the duration of first readings in months 
for the files included in the DEU I & II datasets ....................................................  16 
   EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-011a.htm    3 
 
Introduction 
The co-decision procedure, which became the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ of the 
European Union (EU) with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), has been the subject of a number of 
adaptations during its relatively short history. The practices for the conduct of negotiations 
between the institutions in the context of co-decision have changed considerably over time. 
One of the most important and most controversial of these developments is the increased use 
of the so-called ‘early agreements’, where a deal is reached between the European Parliament 
(EP) and the Council at the first reading stage thus bypassing the often lengthy negotiations 
during second reading and conciliation. It was the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) that made it 
possible to conclude EU co-decision as early as the first reading. This change was motivated 
by a desire to increase the efficiency of EU law-making in a situation where the scope of the 
procedure was to be expanded to more and more new policy areas. The option of concluding 
early agreements has been heavily used ever since, and such deals have been referred to as 
‘fast-track legislation’, or ‘trilogues’.  
Notwithstanding the possible efficiency gains, academics, commentators and the EU 
institutions themselves have been wary about the normative consequences of reaching such 
fast-track agreements. Problems with transparency and the possibility for systematic 
exclusion of some actors, like small states and party groups, from the legislative process are 
two issues that have been raised with regard to the increased used of early agreements 
(Shackleton and Raunio 2003; Farrell and Héritier 2004; Häge and Kaeding 2007; Héritier 
and Reh 2011). Another potential concern with fast-track legislation is that such deals are 
reached so fast that it becomes difficult for the legislative bodies as a whole to allocate 
sufficient time for deliberation and control of the leading negotiators to ensure that these deals 
are representative of the views of the entire legislature (Shackleton and Raunio 2003, Farrell 
and Héritier 2004, CEPS 2009). To assess the seriousness of this part of the critique of early 
agreements, we need to know whether early agreements are reached faster than other deals, 
and whether there is any pattern in the duration of the different kinds of deals depending on 
the saliency and controversy of the legislative dossiers. 
In this article we offer the first systematic study of the impact of early agreements on the 
duration of legislative deliberation by analyzing the factors that influence the length of the 
first readings for co-decision files concluded at different stages of the legislative process. The 
existing literature on EU legislative duration does not provide an answer to this question, 
because it either focuses on overall legislative length (Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; Schulz and 
König 2000; Golub and Steunenberg 2007; König 2007; 2008; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2011) 
or pools data from different legislative procedures (Rasmussen and Toshkov 2011). 
Moreover, rather than examining legislative duration, studies of co-decision have so far 
focused on the conditions under which first reading deals/early agreements occur (Rasmussen 
2011; Reh et al. 2013).  
Our empirical strategy is two-fold. First, we compare the duration of first readings for all 
legislative dossiers submitted under co-decision to the 5
th and 6
th EPs. We find that, overall, 
early agreements endure longer first readings than files reconciled at the second and third EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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stages. But due to reforms in the mechanics of co-decision introduced in 2004 which have 
resulted in longer first readings for all  types of files, this first empirical analysis cannot 
separate the effect of early agreements from the effects of the 2004  institutional reform. 
Subsequently, we conduct and present a second empirical analysis which focuses on 45 
salient and controversial files. The analysis finds evidence that the first readings of early 
agreements indeed last significantly longer than other files, even when we control for inter 
and intra-institutional political disagreements
2
Our findings do not challenge the fact that early agreements entail problems  with 
transparency and open up the possibility for systematic exclusion of some actors. However, 
they show that, even if fast-track legislation restricts access for certain actors to decision 
making, early agreements on salient legislation allow more time for substantive debate and 
negotiations during the first reading stage. 
.  
1.  Early agreements and the co-decision procedure 
As introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the co-decision procedure can include a 
maximum of three legislative readings. The Amsterdam Treaty amendments enabled the co-
legislators to reach legislation as early as the first reading if the Council can find a sufficient 
majority to pass the Commission’s proposal including any amendments the EP might have 
adopted. If not, the procedure moves on to second reading, where it is concluded if the 
Council manages to reach a so-called ‘common position’ and to agree to any amendments the 
EP might put forward to this text. If the EP makes amendments to which the Council cannot 
agree, a conciliation committee is called at the third reading stage where the co-legislators aim 
to reconcile their legislative differences.  
Early agreements require an informal compromise between the legislators. Typically a few 
key representatives from each institution meet in a so-called trilogue and broker a 
compromise at a moment at which neither the EP nor the Council has adopted a formal 
position (Shackleton and Raunio 2003; Farrell and Héritier 2004). Deals reached are 
subsequently presented to the full legislative bodies of the Council and the EP but in such a 
way that it is practically impossible to amend them, which puts the average members of the 
legislative bodies under a severe pressure to accept what is on the table unless they prefer no 
legislation at all. Rasmussen and Shackleton (2005) explain how key negotiators from the 
institutions are subject to very little constraint and monitoring from their parent bodies at such 
an early decision-making stage compared to later in the policy process (2005). 
                                                 
 
2 The DEU data allows us to use elite survey-based dossier-level measures of preference heterogeneity instead of 
the rather indirect institutional proxies used by  Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; Schulz and König 2000; Golub and 
Steunenberg 2007, or the sector-level party positions employed by König 2007; 2008; and Klüver and Sagarzazu 
2010. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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After the introduction of the possibility for early agreements, there has been a clear trend to 
expand the use of first reading conclusions. The increasing share of early agreements 
exceeded even the expectations of practitioners involved in  the  conduct of the procedure 
(Shackleton 2000). Table 1 presents the relative shares of proposals decided at first, second, 
and third reading and the incomplete procedures (a final decision has not been made yet) for 
each year in which the proposals were made for all co-decision cases submitted to the 5
th and 
6
th EPs. Altogether, out of the entire population (899 proposals), 53% have been completed at 
the first reading stage, second reading conclusion took place for a little under a third of all 
files and third reading conclusion (after the involvement of the conciliation committee) is the 
exception, accounting for 8% of the files (10% of all files introduced have not been completed 
by the end of this study). We make an important distinction between first reading conclusions 
which have involved a genuine early agreement and those which have been finalized at first 
reading because the EP has made no amendments at all, or a trivial number of amendments 
that the Council has accepted in full
3
Table 1:  Percentage of co-decision proposals submitted to the 5th and 6th European 
Parliaments by finalization stage and year of proposal 
. Still, early agreements account for between 41% and 
57% of all co-decision files concluded between 2005 and July 2009. 
Year of proposal  1
st reading  2
nd reading  3
rd  reading  Not yet 
adopted  N proposals 
  trivial  early 
agreement         
> July 1999  26 %  5 %  47 %  16 %  5 %  19 
2000  17 %  1 %  51 %  26 %  5 %  86 
2001  13 %  3 %  58 %  19 %  9 %  80 
2002  31 %  6 %  49 %  10 %  4 %  71 
2003  41 %  15 %  32 %  6 %  6 %  110 
2004  32 %  25 %  27 %  7 %  8 %  71 
2005  11 %  41 %  23 %  8 %  18 %  91 
2006  22 %  57 %  18 %  1 %  3 %  118 
2007  28 %  49 %  18 %  1 %  5 %  101 
2008  12 %  55 %  9 %  1 %  23 %  121 
< July 2009  13 %  42 %  6 %  0 %  39 %  31 
TOTAL  23 %  30 %  29 %  8 %  10 %  899 
Source: own data based on the Legislative Observatory 
The increased use of early agreements results in time savings and efficiency gains because 
legislation is adopted faster. In spite of this, there has been no shortage of criticism of first 
reading deals among academic scholars, commentators and the EU institutions themselves. In 
                                                 
 
3 In order to separate early agreements from the rest of the first reading conclusions we employ automated text 
analysis on the documents provided by the Legislative Observatory database. More details on the procedure are 
given in the ‘Research design and data’ section of the article. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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fact, the worries of the potential “side-effects” of concluding early have been so prominent 
that  a substantial  share  of the academic literature on co-decision has shifted away from 
analyzing the relative influence of the different institutions in this and other decision-making 
procedures to a discussion of what the consequences of early agreements are for EU decision-
making (Shackleton and Raunio 2003; Farrell and Héritier 2004; Rasmussen and Shackleton 
2005; Héritier and Reh 2011) and under what conditions they occur (Rasmussen 2011: Reh et 
al. 2013). 
Concerns regarding early agreements relate to the lack of transparency entailed in negotiation 
processes, which often allows for systematic exclusion of important actors. Another concern 
raised about these deals is that they are being pushed through in a fast manner without 
adequate time for deliberation and control of the legislators who negotiate them (CEPS 2009). 
When criticizing first readings, Shackleton and Raunio even go as far as to speak of “a trade-
off, a normative choice between the claims of efficiency and democracy, as democracy is not 
primarily about the speed of the decision-making process” (2003: 183). Statewatch echoes 
this criticism by pointing out how “the efficiency of decision-making is enhanced at the 
expense of transparency, openness and accountability”
4
The claim that early agreements allow for less time for deliberation and negotiation has not 
been tested systematically so far. Naturally, the total amount of time between proposal and 
entry into force is shorter for early agreements since one or two decision-making stages are 
bypassed. However, this still leaves open the possibility that early agreements could extend 
the duration of the first reading and hence provide more time for political discussions at the 
early stage compared to a file that is reconciled later in the legislative process. In the 
remainder of the paper we focus on this question and, after discussing several hypotheses 
about the potential determinants of first reading durations, we present two sets of empirical 
analyses. 
. An important element of Farrell and 
Héritier’s criticism of first reading conclusion is also that they are reconciled in a fast manner. 
In discussing the challenges that national parliamentary committees face in controlling the EU 
outputs, they for example state that, “decisions are typically taken before the member states 
have even had the chance to reach a consensus on a Common Position, let alone to defend 
their negotiating strategies to their respective domestic Parliaments” (2004: 9).  
2.  What determines first reading duration of co-decision files? 
Although our main interest is in evaluating whether the first readings of early agreements last 
longer, we need to envelop this hypothesis into a more general set of theoretical expectations 
about the determinants of legislative duration. We ground these theoretical expectations in the 
existing literature on the duration of the EU legislative process (Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; 
                                                 
 
4  Statewatch Viewpoint, September 2007, “Secret trilogues and the democratic deficit” 
(http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-64-secret-trilogues.pdf). See also and http://euobserver.com, 06.02.2008 
“MEPs fear lack of transparency in quick EU law-making”. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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Schulz and König 2000; Golub and Steunenberg 2007; König 2007; 2008; Rasmussen and 
Toshkov 2011; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2011)
5
2.1.  Early agreements and conclusion stage 
.  
Let us first clearly state the logic behind our main hypothesis that early agreements should 
prolong the negotiations and deliberations during the first reading of the co-decision 
procedure. All things equal, we would expect legislators to spend more time on the first 
readings if they need to reconcile all the items here than if they can also make use of decision 
time at second reading. This does not mean that first reading conclusions last as long as the 
total amount of time spent on second reading conclusions of course. Hence, we know from 
standard micro-economic theory that the marginal productivity of each additional hour spent 
on something is likely to decline over time. Second readings usually take longer than first 
readings meaning that the marginal productivity of the last hours spent on these files is likely 
to be lower than the marginal productivity of the last hours spent on first readings. As a result 
of the higher average productivity for first reading as opposed to second reading files, 
legislators should therefore be able to complete first reading files in a shorter overall period of 
time than second reading files (even if these files have a similar level of controversy). At the 
same time, we would regard it as unrealistic that they are so much more productive in 
concluding early agreements than they do not need more time for their first reading than for 
first readings of files with a similar degree of salience and controversy reconciled later in the 
legislative process. Our expectation is therefore that if conclusion of salient files is reached at 
first reading, then the first reading negotiation period should take longer than if they are 
reconciled later in the policy process (hypothesis 1). If on the other hand, as the conventional 
wisdom indirectly argues, the legislative work at first readings is less thorough because key 
negotiators can push though items with less debate and control, then the length of first 
readings of salient files might be the same no matter whether they are reconciled here or not.  
2.2.  Preference heterogeneity 
Existing duration studies found a positive link between intra and inter-institutional 
disagreements and legislative duration (Schulz and König 2000;  König 2007;  Klüver  and 
Sagarzazu 2011). The theoretical argument derived from spatial decision-making models is 
that the gridlock interval where no policy preferred to the status quo exists is greater the more 
heterogeneous the actor preferences become and the more veto players exist (see for example 
Tsebelis 2002.). Rather than ending up with no policy change in a situation of gridlock, a deal 
is usually brokered by offering a compromise to unsatisfied veto players or providing them 
side-payments. However, in such a case, negotiations can be expected to last longer. In line 
                                                 
 
5 The existing studies do not answer the issue this article addresses because, with the exception of Rasmussen 
and Toshkov 2011, focus on the total length of the legislative process and are concerned with general issues of 
efficiency in EU decision making. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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with these predictions, we expect the first reading negotiations to last longer, the greater the 
level of disagreement between and within the co-legislating institutions (hypothesis 2).   
Whereas the theory linking preference heterogeneity and duration is relatively 
straightforward, testing its predictions is rather challenging in practice. So far, studies have 
not used direct measure of actors’ preferences over individual pieces of legislation to derive 
measure of preference heterogeneity. Instead, several studies have relied on indirect measures 
of preference heterogeneity (Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; Schulz and König 2000; Golub and 
Steunenberg 2007). As an example, Schulz and König (2000) argued that there may be some 
overall differences in the degree of preference heterogeneity between different issue areas and 
different types of EU outputs, and Golub (1997; 2007) expected the level of preference 
disagreement to be linked to specific historical moments in the history of the EU (such as the 
leadership of Thatcher) and important institutional events (such as enlargements). As a result, 
these studies incorporate a series of dummy variables in the equations. The effects of these 
dummy variables are difficult to interpret since we cannot be sure exactly what they measure 
– preference heterogeneity, or some other factor which happened to correlate or coincide with 
enlargements or the tenure of some political party in office. Other pieces of research have 
instead attempted to derive policy positions for the actors by relying on the party manifestos 
of their national political parties (König  2007; 2008; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2011). The 
advantage of such research is that it allows us to derive proposal specific preference positions. 
Moreover,  Klüver  and Sagarzazu’s analysis adds to the existing literature by not only 
controlling for preference heterogeneity within the Council but also between the institutions 
rather than including a dummy for whether the EP acts as a veto player or not. However, in 
spite of these improvements it is still questionable whether controversy and preference 
heterogeneity between EU level actors on concrete pieces of EU legislation can be derived 
from general policy positions of national political parties. As a result, we test our predictions 
using proposal-specific measures (more details on our approach are presented later in the 
text).  
2.3.  Institutional constraints 
Another factor which spatial theory predicts to affect the likelihood of a policy change is the 
institutional set-up (Romer and Rosenthal 1979; Rosenthal 1990). Institutions constrain the 
behavior of the actors by putting forward the requirements they need to fulfill in order to 
reach agreement. In this way, existing literature on duration has shown that the legislative 
process takes longer when the Council operates under unanimity rather than a qualified 
majority requirement (see e.g. Golub 2007 and König 2007). In such a situation, the gridlock 
interval where no policy can be adopted is greater. Again, more compromises and side-
payments will be required to reach agreement, which is expected to increase duration. In our 
case we have no real variation in the decision-making rule, since practically all co-decision 
files are adopted using qualified majority voting. However, we have institutional variation 
over time in another type of rules guiding how the first readings should be adopted.  EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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When the option of early agreement was first introduced, key negotiators from the institutions 
could largely do their work in an unconstrained institutional environment (Rasmussen and 
Shackleton 2005). However,  the EP especially has become aware of the potential dangers 
involved in letting their rapporteurs negotiate with the Council without any control and 
monitoring, and efforts have been made to constrain these negotiators more and more. In 
November 2004, a set of guidelines on how to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements 
at first and second reading was approved by the Conference of Presidents and confirmed by 
the Conference of Committee Chairs (EP 2007;  Shackleton and Rasmussen 2005; EP 2009).  
Also the subsequent Joint Declaration from 2006 on the conduct of co-decision between the 
Institutions made reference to how each institution would designate and define the mandate of 
their representatives in the meetings. Moreover, the guidelines have recently been replaced by 
a “Code of Conduct for Negotiating Codecision Files” adopted by the Conference of 
Presidents on 18.9.2008. According to the EP itself, “In comparison to the rather vague term 
‘guidelines’, its name is intended to underline its more binding nature” (2009: 26). The code 
also specifies in more detail how negotiations ought to be conducted, for example how the 
negotiating team of the EP should be monitored and collect mandate and what the role of the 
relevant EP committee monitoring the key negotiators is. When the EP adopted a revision of 
its Rules of Procedure on 6 May 2009, it was annexed to its Rules.  
All of this demonstrates that early agreements are no longer struck in the kind of institution-
free environment that existed initially. Nowadays, there are quite elaborate constraints on the 
key negotiators that require  them to report back to their committees regularly, collect 
mandates etc. These rules do not fundamentally change the majority requirement for adoption 
of the early agreements of course. The key negotiators still only need to present the co-
legislators with a compromise which they prefer to the status quo. However, whereas they 
could choose earlier where to place such a compromise within the winset of possible deals 
that satisfy their legislative bodies, this choice is now constrained. Giving these legislative 
bodies as a whole more influence on exactly what the final deals looks like by making sure 
that they give regular mandates and receive information during the negotiation process might 
mean that their key negotiators need more time to conclude the informal negotiations. Our 
expectation is therefore that, as stricter procedures have been introduced for the conduct of 
early agreements over time, they last longer (hypothesis 3).  
3.  Research design and data 
In order to estimate the effect of early agreements on legislative duration we use a two-fold 
empirical approach that relies on two different datasets. In this section, we describe the data 
sources and operationalizations of the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
In both sets of analyses the unit of observation is a legislative dossier (file) and all variables 
are measured at this level of aggregation. The first dataset includes the entire population of 
co-decision proposals submitted to the EP between July 1999 and July 2009 – a period which 
covers the 5
th and the 6
th terms of the EP. We accessed the necessary data in June 2011 using EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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automated data extraction from the Legislative Observatory and complemented it with records 
from Prelex (a database monitoring the inter-institutional decision-making and managed by 
the Commission). Our second dataset focuses on highly salient co-decision proposals studied 
in the framework of the ‘Decision making in the European Union’ (DEU) I and II projects 
(Thomson et al 2006; Thomson 2011).  The major advantages of the second dataset are that it 
offers precise dossier-level estimates of preference heterogeneity (see below) and that it is 
deliberately restricted to a set of highly salient files (thus keeping saliency relatively 
constant). The overall dataset includes 125 controversial consultation, co-decision and assent 
files, from which we selected all the co-decision files, which were concluded at the time of 
the analysis, i.e. altogether 45 files. Our selection includes proposals from a large number of 
different policy areas before and after enlargement that were of political importance and 
involved some controversy. The latter was determined by only including proposals mentioned 
in different EU news sources and on which interviewed experts indicated that there was 
substantive disagreement. From the 45 completed co-decision files in the DEU datasets, 19 
are finalized at first reading, 24 are concluded at 2
nd reading and 2 are finalized at the last 3
rd 
reading stage. 
Our dependent variable – the duration of legislative deliberation – is the same in both sets of 
empirical analyses and is defined as the difference in months between the date of the adoption 
of the EP’s first reading position  (technically, it is called a ‘legislative resolution  on the 
proposal’) and the date of the legislative proposal. The necessary data is obtained from the 
Legislative Observatory. 
The main independent variable that we use classifies all legislative dossiers into four groups - 
early agreements, ‘trivial’ first reading conclusions, second, and third reading conclusions. 
The files comprising the first two groups had to be finalized and had to have no second or 
third reading. Data on the conclusion stage is available from the Legislative Observatory. The 
tricky part in constructing this variable is separating genuine early agreements from the trivial 
first reading conclusions. To do so we employed the following strategy. First, using 
automated data extraction and text analysis we downloaded all documents related to the first 
reading and summaries of the first readings in the institutions from the Legislative 
Observatory. Second, we searched the summaries for references to “informal”, 
“compromise”, “trilogue”, or “agreement”. Third, we classified as early agreements the files 
that mentioned either of these terms.We selected the search terms after careful hand-coding of 
several dozens of cases. ‘To give an example, the EP summary of the first reading on ‘Rail 
transport: interoperability of the Community rail system’  (COD/2006/0273) states “The text 
adopted in plenary was the result of an agreement negotiated with the Council”  Alternative 
approaches like relying on the number of adopted EP amendments or the novelty of the legal 
acts proved unsatisfactory while the text-based approach delivered results that closely match 
existing estimates of the prevalence of early agreements (Reh et al. 2013) and that could be 
validated using human coding. 
The level of political disagreement is our second independent variable. We use the number of 
amendments in the EP’s first reading report as a proxy for general conflict. However, this EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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measure is not without limitations since some EP first reading amendments are often 
compromises reached between the Council and the EP how to change the Commission 
proposal rather than straightforward indicators of the level of conflict between the EP and the 
Council. This is why, in the second set of empirical analyses, we employ two additional 
indicators of disagreement that capture preference heterogeneity between the member states in 
the Council of Ministers, and between the EP and the Council. These indicators rely on 
expert-based measures of preference positions of the actors involved in the negotiations, 
which makes it possible to control for preference heterogeneity using proposal specific 
measures rather than indirect measures of preference heterogeneity (Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; 
Schulz and König 2000; Golub and Steunenberg 2007) or measures derived from positions of 
national political parties (König 2007; 2008; Klüver and Sagarzazu 2011). The preference 
positions come from face-to-face interviews with experts involved in decision-making 
processes. Experts were asked to identify the dominant issue dimension(s) of conflicts, to 
indicate how salient the issues were and to specify numerical estimates for the policy 
positions of the key  actors while justifying the information with qualitative evidence 
(Thomson 2011). The validity and reliability of the estimates have been checked by 
comparing the expert information to information from documentation on Council decision 
making (Thomson 2006) and judgments of different experts with each other (Thomson 2006; 
König et al. 2007). In both cases, a high degree of congruence was found. 
The indicator of preference heterogeneity within the Council is the average of the ranges 
[maximum - minimum] of member states’ positions on each issue part of a proposal, weighted 
by the relative salience of the issue. The indicator of the disagreement between the EP and the 
Council is the distance between the EP’s position and the Council’s compromise, averaged 
over each issue part of a proposal whereas issues are again weighted by their relative salience. 
The next variable that we use captures the effect of the institutional reforms of co-decision 
and is a binary indicator whether the first reading deal has been reached by the 5
th or the 6
th 
EPs. The start of the work of the 6
th EP roughly coincides with the adoption of the guidelines 
on how to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements at first reading in November 2004. 
Finally, we include a series of control variables in the general analysis, which measure 
characteristics of the negotiated files. First, we control for whether the negotiated act is new, 
an amendment to or a codification of an existing act. We know that the Better Regulation 
agenda of the Commission has reduced the amount of new legislation put forward and put 
emphasis on simplification and codification of existing legislation
6.  Over time, the share of 
such new legislation adopted has decreased whereas the share of acts codifying, recasting and 
repealing existing legislation has gone up
7
                                                 
 
6 A description of the programme can be found in the Commission’s “Third progress report on the strategy for 
simplifying the regulatory environment” COM(2009)15, COM(2009)16, and  COM(2009)17. 
. We need to examine how closely any change in 
7 Codification means bringing all amendments to a given law adopted at different times into one law. Recasting 
implies modifying existing legislation whilst simultaneously codifying it in one consolidated text incorporating 
all previous amendments. Repeals recall existing pieces of legislation or replace them with new content. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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the length of the first reading negotiation period is linked to the fact that the character of the 
legislative proposals in the period examined has changed. The EP itself emphasizes that this 
factor plays a role by stating that, “Part of the explanation for the changing pattern of 
conclusions lies in the submission by the Commission of a significant number of proposals 
‘recasting’ or codifying existing legislation” (2007: 10). The existing literature of duration in 
EU legislative processes does not include a control for these variables.  
Second, we control for the legal character of the act, which has been shown in previous work 
on legislative duration to affect the length  of the negotiations. Schulz and König (2000) 
showed  that  negotiations of directives last longer than of regulations and decisions. The 
argument put forward in previous research is that because directives require national 
implementation, member states can be expected to be less flexible when negotiating them, 
leading to a longer bargaining process (Schulz and König, 2000). It has also been emphasized 
how directives typically deal with more significant issues than non-directives (Golub, 2008). 
Even if our main focus is not the overall length of the negations but that of the first readings 
in one specific legislative procedure, the legal character of the file might also matter.  
We employ negative binomial regression as the method of analysis. The dependent variable is 
essentially a count of the months between proposal and the adoption of the EP’s first reading 
position (legislative resolution) and its empirical distribution fits well a negative binomial 
distribution with the variance (28.3) higher than than  the  mean (9.9)  –  hence a negative 
binomial model is preferred to a Poisson model as it can accommodate overdispersion. 
Scholars of legislative duration have often used event history, and more specifically the semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard models (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004), as the 
preferred method of analysis. However, in our case the major advantage of event history 
(survival) models – the ability to handle censored observations - is lost because we have to 
exclude from the analysis all cases that are not completed by the time we collected the data 
since they do not have a value on our main independent variable. Nevertheless, we replicated 
the analyses presented below using Cox proportional hazard models and all inferences that we 
make on the basis of the negative binomial regressions stand. The decision to present in the 
article the former rather than the latter is due to the fact that the Cox event history models run 
into problems with the proportional hazard assumption (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) 
– problems which do not completely disappear when we interact the independent variables 
with time. 
4.  The effect of early agreements on first reading duration 
In order to estimate the effect of early agreements on legislative duration we start with an 
analysis of the entire population of proposals submitted to the European Parliament between 
July 1999 and July 2009 – a period which covers the 5
th and the 6
th terms of the EP. The 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 already give an idea about the differences in 
duration between early agreements, trivial first readings and the rest of the files. On average, 
the conclusion of first reading when an early agreement is done is a little more than 11 EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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months (same as the first reading of files that would eventually be concluded at third reading). 
As expected, trivial first reading last much less – 7.4 months while second reading deals have 
an average first reading duration of 9.6. The average duration of first readings seems to have 
increased over time, especially for 2
nd and 3
rd reading deals, but unfortunately the trend is 
masked by the censoring of the 2008 and 2009 observations.  
Table 2: Duration of first reading in months by final stage and year of proposal 
Year of proposal  1
st reading  2
nd reading  3
rd  reading  Not yet 
 adopted 
  trivial  early agreement       
> July 1999  8,6  14,0  8,1  9,7  2,0 
2000  8,0  15,0  9,7  9,5  10,5 
2001  8,0  6,5  9,5  9,2  8,9 
2002  7,8  10,5  8,4  12,0  16,3 
2003  6,4  8,7  9,2  10,9  6,7 
2004  9,8  15,2  15,1  15,2  17,8 
2005  6,0  14,5  13,2  15,9  9,1 
2006  6,6  10,1  13,1  15,0  15,7 
2007  7,3  10,9  10,5  10,0  9,0 
2008  5,2  8,4  6,3  5,0  12,1 
< July 2009  7,3  9,2  3,0  NA  15,8 
AVERAGE  7,4  11,2  9,6  11,2  11,3 
Source: own data based on the Legislative Observatory 
Having introduced the data, we move forward to the regression analysis. Table 3 reports the 
results of the first set of four models. Model A1 includes our main variable of interest – the 
stage at which the dossier was concluded, and the number of EP amendments. According to 
the model, the first readings of trilogues (early agreements) last significantly longer than the 
first readings of the baseline category (2
nd reading conclusions).  
Early agreements lead to 8% longer 1
st  readings  (the effect sizes are computed by 
exponentiation of the coefficients in Table 3), according to the model, which translates into 
approximately one additional month. Apparently, although statistically significant the effect is 
rather small. On the other hand, the first readings of trivial files are 22% shorter than the 
baseline, and 3
rd reading files are slightly but not significantly longer. Moreover, the number 
of EP amendments has the expected positive effect on the duration of 1
st readings – a standard 
deviation change (83 amendments) brings a 10% increase in the duration.  
Model A2 includes an additional set of control variables – the type and novelty of the legal 
proposal, and the responsible Commission DG (which controls for the policy area). The 
original findings remain robust and, according to the model, the first readings of directives 
and new acts last significantly longer than decisions and amending/codification acts. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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Table 3:  Negative binomial models of the duration of first readings in months 
 for all co-decision files submitted between July 1999 and July 2009 
Variable  Model A1  Model A2  Model A3  Model A4 
  Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
(Intercept)  2.21 
(0.03)*** 
1.85 
(0.22) 
2.12 
(0.04) 
1.90 
(0.21)*** 
Finalization stage: (2
nd is baseline)         
1
st (early agreement)  0.08 
(0.04)* 
0.09 
(0.04)* 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
1
st (trivial)  -0.25 
(0.05)*** 
-0.17 
(0.05)** 
-0.30 
(0.05)*** 
-0.20 
(0.05)*** 
3
rd (conciliation)  0.08 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.06)* 
0.10 
(0.06) 
Type of act: (decision is baseline)      -   
Directive  -  0.25 
(0.07)***  -  0.23 
(0.07)*** 
Regulation  -  0.14 
(0.07)*  -  0.10 
(0.07) 
Amending/codification act  -  -0.12 
(0.04)**  -  -0.12 
(0.04)*** 
Number of EP amend-s (10)  0.01 
(0.00)*** 
0.01 
(0.00)*** 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00)*** 
6
th EP term  -  -  0.25 
(0.04)*** 
0.26 
(0.04)*** 
  N=805  N=752  N=805  N=752 
     N.B. Models 2 and 4 include controls for the responsible Commission DG as well. 
    Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
In Models A3 and A4, we add the EP term as another explanatory variable. According to 
Model A3, the institutional reforms indeed resulted in a longer time lapse before the EP 
adopts its first opinion: the positive and significant coefficient implies a 28% increase in the 
duration (or between 2 and 3 months). This means that even before the guidelines were re-
established by the new code of conduct, they may have had an effect on duration. This is 
interesting since one of the reasons for tightening the guidelines listed by the EP was exactly 
that, “It is not clear to what extent these guidelines have been applied since their adoption” 
(EP 2008: 26). 
Moreover, once we include the EP term in the model, the difference between the duration of 
first reading for early agreements and second reading deals disappears (the additional controls 
in Model A4 do not affect these findings).  According to the EP itself, “This trend can be 
explained with the higher number of 1
st reading agreements which included more and more 
controversial files which need more time to be negotiated and where parliament strives to get 
the best deal” (2009: 13). It could also be due to the effect of the Eastern Enlargement. What 
we can confirm is that the trend of longer first readings is robust to the inclusion of controls 
for the character of the files, which means that it is not driven by the changing composition of 
co-decision dossiers that the EP has to deal with. In a recent report, the EP itself confirms EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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how the new procedures have taken effect, which means that the institutional set-up at first 
reading has now become similar to the tighter rules at the conciliation stage: “Conciliation 
provides a model which is gradually being implemented in 1st and 2nd reading negotiations. 
Interpretation and translation is fully provided for, the delegation is regularly informed by and 
mandates the negotiation team, and the entire process is fully documented in a 4-column 
working document” (2009: 23). The conduct of fast-track legislation looks different from the 
initial period that scholars and commentators examined. Extensive procedures have been put 
in place, which seem to increase the length of the first readings. In fact, we see that, once we 
include the EP term in the model, the difference between the duration of first reading for early 
agreements and second reading deals disappears (the additional controls in Model A4 do not 
affect these findings). All things considered, it is hard to say whether the apparent global 
difference between the early agreements and 2
nd reading deals is due to the increased use of 
early agreements after 2004 when all first readings started to take longer, or to any systematic 
effect of the conduct of early agreements. In any case, when all co-decision proposals are 
considered, the effect of early agreements on duration is likely to be small.  
By including the number of EP amendments, and in models A2 and A4 the type, novelty and 
policy area of the proposals, we have tried to account for the possibility that early agreements 
and the rest of the files differ systematically in their salience
8
Table 4 present the results from the negative binomial models estimated on this restricted 
sample. Models B1 and B3 includes the same set of variables as models A1 and A3 from 
Table 3, respectively (the only difference is that there are no trivial cases in this dataset so this 
category is not present).  The findings, however, differ noticeably. First, the difference 
between the 1
st reading duration of early agreements and 2
nd reading deals is much bigger 
now, and it is robust to the inclusion of the EP term in the model (Model B3). Substantively, 
early agreements increase the duration of 1
st readings by 55% (according to Model B1) – they 
add more than 6 months to the average for the sample 12 months from proposal till 
completion of 1
st reading.  
. The variables that we use, 
however, are imperfect proxies for salience and disagreement. Moreover, due to data 
limitations, in the analysis presented above we are not able to control for the preference 
heterogeneity between the EP and the Council which is a possible confounding variable. To 
address these two shortcomings, we present a second set of analyses which is restricted to the 
45 highly salient DEU proposals.  
When we take into account the institutional innovations in 2004, the  effect of early 
agreements drops slightly but, unlike in the analysis of the entire population of co-decision 
files and despite of the much smaller sample size, it remains significant and is associated with 
a 46% increase in duration vis-à-vis second reading deals. Again we see an effect of these 
                                                 
 
8  Models which add interaction effects between the number of EP amendments or the EP term and the 
finalization stage variable do not show any significant interactions regarding the difference in duration between 
early agreements and 2
nd reading deals. EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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guidelines on duration even before they were tightened in the new code of conduct. 
Interestingly, the number of EP amendments is no longer significantly related to duration – 
apparently for highly salient files, the additional effect of EP amendments disappears (the 
DEU sample has a mean of 114 amendments vs. the average of 54 amendments in the entire 
population of proposals).  
Table 4:  Negative binomial models of the duration of first readings in months 
for the files included in the DEU I&II datasets 
Variable  Model B1  Model B2  Model B3  Model B4 
  Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
Coeff. 
(St.error) 
(Intercept)  2.21 
(0.13)*** 
1.65 
(0.34)*** 
2.00 
(0.18)*** 
1.45 
(0.35)*** 
Finalization stage: (2
nd is baseline)         
1
st (early agreement)  0.44 
(0.15)** 
0.45 
(0.14)** 
0.38 
(0.14)* 
0.40 
(0.14)** 
3
rd (conciliation)  -0.17 
(0.44) 
-0.09 
(0.42) 
-0.14 
(0.41) 
-0.05 
(0.40) 
EP-Council preference distance  -  0.01 
(0.00)*  -  0.01 
(0.00)* 
Council preference heterogeneity  -  0.01 
(0.01)  -  0.01 
(0.01) 
Number of EP amend-s (10)  0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6
th EP term  -  -  0.35 
(0.18) 
0.32 
(0.18) 
  N=45  N=45  N=45  N=45 
    Significance codes:   ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
Models B2 and B4 take into account the possible confounding influence of the preference 
distance between the EP and the Council, and of the preference heterogeneity within the 
Council
9
In summary, our empirical analyses support the following conclusions: When all proposals 
submitted between 1999 and 2009 are considered, the duration of first reading has 
significantly increased after the institutional reforms in 2004. Because this reform coincides 
with the increased use of early agreements, it is difficult to say whether trilogues lead to 
. Our original findings stand – if anything, the size and significance of the difference 
between early agreements and 2
nd reading deals increases. In addition, the preference distance 
between the EP and the Council has a significant and positive impact on the duration of first 
readings, while the differences within the Council do not seem to play a role. A standard 
deviation change in the EP-Council distance increases the duration of first readings by 17% 
(or approximately 2 months), according to Model B2. 
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longer first readings, but if there is an effect, it is likely to be small (less than a month). 
However, when only highly salient proposals are discussed, then the duration of the 1
st 
reading stage takes significantly longer if an early deal is struck at first reading. Moreover, the 
difference is present both before and after the reforms in 2004. These findings are robust to 
controls for the type of proposal, the number of EP amendments, the preference heterogeneity 
within the Council, and the extent of disagreement between the EP and the Council. 
Conclusion 
Even though early agreements of EU co-decision files have significantly reduced the overall 
duration of the legislative process, they have received a substantial amount of  criticism. 
Scholars, policy experts and MEPs have pointed out how this increase in the efficiency of EU 
law means that deals are now reached so fast that there is little opportunity for broad input 
into such deals both from within and outside the legislative bodies. Our analysis does not 
allow us to rule out that there are normative issues with early agreements. However, 
scrutinizing the conditions under which these negotiations have a varying length casts a more 
nuanced view on early agreements than the existing literature. Hence our findings 
demonstrate that even if early agreements lead to overall efficiency gains, they do allow more 
time for negotiation and deliberation when salient legislation is on the bargaining table and 
there is a level of political disagreement between the co-legislators.  
We find that the length of their first reading negotiation period is longer than that of files 
concluded at second reading, when the debated legislation is highly salient.  Whether the fact 
that the first reading negotiation period of the early agreements are on average 46 per cent 
longer than that of files concluded at second reading is enough to ensure enough time for 
deliberation and input from the various actors in the EP is of course a normative issue that we 
cannot settle. Nevertheless, these findings do indicate that the co-legislators compensate for 
some of the lost time from not going to second reading by extending the length of the first 
reading negotiations when the deals are salient.  
Rather than finding evidence that deals are pushed through quickly irrespective of how 
controversial they are, we find that the co-legislators spend more time on the first reading 
negotiation period the greater the level of political disagreement between them. Finally, we 
see a general trend in our analysis of all co-decision files submitted to the 5
th and 6
th EP that 
the duration of the early agreement has increased over time. Negotiation of fast-track 
legislation looks different today from the early period of first reading deals discussed among 
commentators and academic scholars
10
                                                 
 
10 Another institutional change, which might contribute to increasing legislative length is the so-called period of 
“cooling-off” introduced  by the Working Party on Parliamentary Reform, i.e. “a period of at least one month 
between the vote on any legislative report in committee (on first reading) and the vote on it in plenary”. The rule 
became applicable on 1.1.2008 and its aim was to facilitate time for deliberation within the political groups after 
conclusion of first readings negotiations with the Council and the resulting vote in the EP plenary (EP 2009).  
. This trend holds even when we control for EIoP   © 2012 by Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen 
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characteristics of the file, such as its number of amendments, legal nature and novelty. In this 
way, it appears that the number of initiatives that the EP has undertaken to formalize, clarify 
and institutionalize the procedures according to which early agreements are concluded have 
had an effect. Hence, the increased amount of time spent on concluding first reading deals 
coincides with the implementation of the reforms. Much work remains to systematically 
examine the consequences of early agreements
11
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